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STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
DONALD GENE KAZDA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 10046. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed from his conviction of as-
saultwith intent to commit murder in violation of 76-30-14, 
U.C.A. 1953, and robbery, in violation of 76-51-1, U.C.A. 
1953, upon jury trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Duchesne County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was brought to trial on the charges from 
which he now appeals after reversal of his previous convic-
tion by this court. State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 
407 ( 1963). After jury trial, upon which a verdict of guilty 
was returned, the appellant was committed to the Utah 
State Penitentiary for the indeterminate terms provided by 
law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that this court 
should affirm the appellant's conviction on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of facts as 
constituting the evidence of the case when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Ward, 10 U.2d 
34,347 P.2d 865 ( 1959). 
In the month of February, 1962, the defendant, along 
with his brother, Dennis, and one Norma Rae Barker, left 
Salmon, Idaho, travelling south into Utah (R. 8). They 
arrived in Duchesne, Utah, on the evening of the 20th of 
February, 1962, at approximately 7:00 P.M. (R. 9). Im-
mediately after leaving Duchesne, the defendant made a 
statement that he knew of a gas station and grocery store 
which would be a good place to "hold up" (R. 10). Prior 
to arriving at Bridgeland, Utah, the defendant took a shot-
gun from under the seat and a pistol was removed from the 
glove box of the automobile ( R. 10) . The defendant, his 
brother and Mrs. Barker stopped at the combined home, 
grocery store and service station of Eldon Brady. Accord-
ing to the testimony of Norma Barker, the appellant and his 
brother put stockings over their heads and entered the store, 
with the appellant carrying the shotgun. Thereafter she 
heard a blast and saw a flash. The appellant and his brother 
returned to the car and the appellant was carrying the shot-
gun ( R. 13, 14) . Thereafter, the trio left and as they drove 
away the appellant stated to Mrs. Barker that the money 
he obtained was "not much to shoot an old man for" ( R. 
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t·t). Subsequently, the shotgun was thrown out of the car as 
was a wallet which was later identified as being that of 
Eldon Brady ( R. 15) . 
A short time later Sheriff George Marett and others ob-
served Mr. Brady who had been shot in the forearm and the 
breast by what would appear to be a shotgun (R. 26, 28). 
Shotgun pellets were found in the area where Mr. Brady 
was lying ( R. 26, 29) . Subsequently the shotgun was found 
in the vicinity of Indian Canyon ( R. 35) and Mr. Brady's 
billfold was found approximately one mile away (R. 46). 
A special agent from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion testified that he interrogated the appellant in April, 
1962, and that the appellant admitted being present at the 
time of the shooting and the robbery, but contended that he 
was in the back seat drunk ( R. 58) . 
Sheriff Marett testified that he had endeavored to serve 
a subpoena on one Johnnie Buck, who had previously testi-
fied at the prior trial, and that Johnnie Buck was in the 
Nebraska State Penitentiary (R. 38-42), and not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. 
Subsequently, over objection, the trial court permitted 
the testimony received at the previous hearing of Johnnie 
Buck to be read to the jury. His testimony was to the effect 
that the appellant, in his presence, had admitted to the 
holdup at Bridgeland, Utah, and had stated that he had 
shot an old man with a shotgun ( R. 64) . The appellant did 
not testify, but his brother, Dennis, did testify and stated 
that he, Dennis, did the shooting rather than the appellant, 
and that his brother had been in the back seat of the motor 
vehicle drunk at the time. 
~Irs. Barker and Dennis Kazda, the brother of the ap-
pellant, admitted convictions for the same crime for which 
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the appellant was being charged. Mrs. Barker stated she 
had been convicted as an accessory ( R. 18) . 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a find-
ing of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT CAN CLAIM NO ERROR BASED UPON 
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO CONTINUE 
HIS TRIAL PENDING DISPOSITION OF HIS PETITION 
FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT COMPLAINING OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FAlL-
URE TO GRANT THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A 
CHANGE OF VENUE. 
The appellant in Point I of his brief contends that the 
trial court erred in forcing him to go to trial after overrul-
ing his motion for a change of venue while there was pend-
ing before the Supreme Court a petition for an extraordi-
nary writ to review the trial court's decision. At the outset 
it should be observed that the appellant does not contend 
that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a 
change of venue. Indeed, he notes that it is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court whether or not to grant 
a motion for a change of venue. This court has on several 
occasions so ruled. Winters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222, 278 
Pac. 816 ( 1929); Chamblee v. Stocks, 9 U.2d 342,344 P.2d 
980 ( 1959); Anderson v. johnson, 1 U.2d408, 268 P.2d427 
( 1954); State v. Bunis, 388 P.2d 233 (Utah 1964). The 
appellant's only contention is that the trial court committed 
error in proceeding merely because there was a petition to 
the Supreme Court to review the matter. It is submitted 
that the appellant is in no position to complain. Since he 
does not on appeal contend that there was an abuse of dis-
cretion in denying the change of venue, he cannot complain 
because the trial court did not continue the matter pending 
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a ruling from the Supreme Court. He could, had he so 
desired, have sought review of the question of change of 
\'Cnue by this appeal. Having failed to seek that remedy, in 
the absence of a contention that the trial court was without 
jurisdiction, the question of whether the court should or 
should not have proceeded to trial is moot. There is no ques-
tion but what the trial court had jurisdiction since there was 
nothing pending before the Supreme Court but a mere peti-
tion for extraordinary writ. No writ had as yet issued nor 
did the Supreme Court ever issue a writ. Until the Supreme 
Court assumed jurisdiction of the case, the trial court was 
within its discretion in proceeding to determine the issues. 
In 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 499, p. 166, it is 
stated: 
"* * * A continuance asked by accused, on the magistrate's over-
ruling his motion for a change of venue, to enable him to apply 
for mandamus to compel the change, is properly refused, his rem-
edy being by appeal." 
See State v. Barnett, 98 So. Caro. 422, 82 S.E. 795. 
It has been generally recognized that where the grant-
ing or a refusal of a motion for a change of venue is within 
the discretion of the court, the ruling thereon cannot be 
reviewed by mandamus. Only if the question of a change 
of venue is ministerial can the remedy of mandamus lie. 
Pace v. Wolfe, 76 Utah 368, 289 Pac. 1102 ( 1930). 
Generally it is recognized that venue may not be re-
viewed by mandamus, prohibition or certiorari. 56 Am. 
Jur., Venue, Sec. 75; Annotation 170 ALR 528. See also 
Witkin, Extraordinary Writs in Criminal Practice, First 
Criminal Law Seminar (Cohn 1961), where the author 
observes that there is no need for extraordinary writs in 
criminal cases in most instances where the appellate remedy 
is readily available. 
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It is clear from Utah law that a motion for a change 
of venue, not based on irregular venue, lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. In these instances it has 
usually been determined that certiorari or other extraordi-
nary writ will not lie to review the court's discretion, since 
( 1) appeal is available and the order is not as yet final, 
State v. Goode, 4 Ida. 730,44 Pac. 640; or (2) that the 
abuse of discretion must be so patent and obvious as to raise 
no issue of fact. People v. District Court, 72 Colo. 525, 211 
Pac. 626 ( 1922) . This court has recognized as much in 
other cases since in Page v. Commercial National Bank of 
Salt Lake City, 38 Utah 440, 112 Pac. 816, the court recog-
nized that certiorari would not lie to review interlocutory 
orders. Consequently, it is manifest that there is no merit 
to the appellant's position; first, since the court was not 
without jurisdiction merely by the filing of a petition for 
extraordinary writ in the Supreme Court, and could, in its 
discretion proceed; second, the remedy being sought by the 
appellant was improper; and, third, appellant can claim 
no prejudice since he does not in this case contend an abuse 
of discretion based upon the failure to grant the change of 
venue. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ALLOW-
ING THE TESTIMONY OF JOHNNIE BUCK, GIVEN AT A 
PRIOR HEARING, TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE AT 
THE APPELLANT'S TRIAL WHERE THE WITNESS WAS 
CONFINED IN PRISON OUT OF STATE. 
The appellant contends that the trial court committed 
error in receiving the testimony of Johnnie Buck given at 
his previous trial. It is undisputed that Mr. Buck was not 
within the State of Utah and in fact was confined in a Ne-
braska State Prison. Even so, the appellant contends that 
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an effort should have been made to obtain the presence of 
Johnnie Buck. The basis of the appellant's contention is 
that 77-45-12, and 13, U.C.A. 1953, provide a means for 
the obtaining of witnesses from out of state, and that an 
effort should have been made to obtain the absent witness 
by exercising the provisions of these statutes. The cited 
statutes are the Utah version of the Uniform Act to Secure 
the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in 
Criminal Cases. The identical same argument raised by 
the appellant in this case was raised in the case of State v. 
Leggroan, Utah Supreme Court No. 10004, February 14, 
1964. In that case the appellants contended that a primary 
witness who resided in California should have been secured 
pursuant to the Uniform Act prior to allowing the testi-
mony of the witness given at preliminary hearing to be read 
to the jury. This court rejected the argument, noting that 
the Uniform Act ( 7 7-4 5-12 and 13 ) is permissive in tenor. 
The court noted in rejecting the argument similar to that 
raised by the appellant herein: 
''Perhaps the obvious practical, jurisdictional and possible consti-
tutional problems that might be raised, together with the permis-
sive tenor of the Act, have led the courts, wherever the problem 
has arisen, almost unanimously to conclude that the Act, as to 
production of witnesses, may be helpful in a given case, permis-
sive in nature, but not mandatory. We think such authorities re-
flect good reason and logic and we go along with them under the 
facts of this particular case." 
The court relied upon and cited with approval cases from 
other jurisdictions where a similar ruling had been made. 
People v. Serra, 301 Mich. 124, 3 N.W.2d 35 ( 1942); 
People v. Hunley, 313 Mich. 688, 21 N.W.2d 923 ( 1946); 
State l'. Jordan, 83 Ariz. 248,320 P.2d 446 ( 1958); People 
z·. Day, 219 Cal. 562, 27 P.2d 909 ( 1933). 
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Consequently, it is apparent that the appellant's argu-
ment is foreclosed and without merit. The trial court relied 
upon the provisions of 77--44-3, U.C.A. 1953, providing the 
jurisdictional prerequisites for the admissibility of the testi-
mony of absent witnesses. State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260 
P.2d 539 ( 1953). The trial court's reliance was properly 
placed in view of this court's decision in State v. Leggroan, 
supra. Consequently, there is no merit to the appellant's 
position. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CORROBORATION OF THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE ACCOMPLICE, NORMA BARKER, 
TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT. 
The appellant contends that there was insufficient cor-
roborative evidence of the accomplice, Norma Barker, to 
convict him in view of the provisions of 77-31-18, U.C.A. 
1953, prohibiting the conviction of an accused upon the 
testimony of an accomplice in the absence of some evidence 
tending to independently corroborate his commission of the 
cnme. 
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 ( 1963), 
this court recognized that evidence virtually identical with 
that received in the instant case was more than sufficient to 
corroborate the testimony of Mrs. Barker. The appellant 
apparently relies for his argument upon the position that 
the testimony of Johnnie Buck should not have been re-
ceived in evidence. As can be seen from the argument made 
in Point II of this brief, there is no merit to the appellant's 
position, and the admissions made by the appellant to Mr. 
Buck in and of themselves amply corroborate the testimony 
of Mrs. Barker. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 
(1942) ;Statev. Vigil, 123 Utah495, 260P.2d539 (1953). 
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Consequently, there is no merit to appellant's position on 
the sufficiency of corroborative evidence. 
POINT IV. 
THERE W:\S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY 
TO C:ONVlCT THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF AS-
"·\l rr.T \\'lTII INTENT TO COMMIT MURDER. 
The appellant contends that the evidence before the jury 
was insufficient to convict him of the crime of assault with 
intent to commit murder. The basis of the appellant's con-
tention is that there is no evidence sufficient to show his 
intent. It is a generally recognized rule of law that intent 
may be presumed from the natural and probable conse-
quences of one's acts. Dunlap v. United States, 70 F.2d 35 
(7th Circuit 1934); Perkins, Criminal Law ( 1958), p. 659. 
In State v. Minousis, 64 Utah 206, 228 Pac. 574 ( 1924), 
the appellant was convicted of the crime of assault with 
intent to commit murder. The facts and circumstances are 
substantively similar to those in the instant case in that 
there \\·as no direct evidence of the appellant's intent. In 
affirming the conviction, this court stated: 
"It is equally well settled that such specific intent may be proved by 
circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence, and that it may be in-
ferred from the acts and conduct of the accused, the nature of 
the weapon used by defendant and manner in which it was used, 
taken together with all the other circumstances in the case. 2 
Bishop, New Grim. Proc. § 1101; 3 Bishop, New Grim. Proc. § 661; 
~Iichie on Homicide, p. 1343, § 257; Abb. Trial Brief Grim. Cas. 
677, 678; Lovett v. State, 9 Ga. App. 232, 70 S.E. 989; State v. 
Ruck, 19-t ~Io. 416,92 S.W. 706,5 Ann. Cas. 976; People v. Scott, 
6 .Mich. 287; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 15 S.W. 889, 26 Am. 
St. Rep. -t-t; People v. Owens, 3 Cal. App. 750, 86 Pac. 980; State 
, .. ~!ills, 6 Pennewill, 497, 69 Atl. 841; Crosby v. People, 137 Ill. 
325, 27 :\'.E. 49; People v. Landman, 103 Cal. 577, 37 Pac. 518 . 
.. In discussing the question of intent in a case somewhat similar to 
the one at bar, that eminent jurist, Mr. Justice Campbell, of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
Supreme Court of Michigan, in the course of his opinion in People 
v. Scott, supra, said: 
'The intent to kill must undoubtedly be established, as an in-
ference of fact, to the satisfaction of the jury; but they may draw 
that inference, as they draw all other inferences, from any fact in 
evidence which, to their minds fairly proves its existence. Inten-
tions can only be proved by acts, as juries cannot look into the 
breast of the criminal.' " -, 
An examination of the facts in this case overwhelmingly 
demonstrate that there was ample evidence upon which a 
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appel-
lant had the intent to commit murder. First, the appellant 
entered the store of Mr. Eldon Brady armed with a loaded 
shotgun. Secondly, he admitted firing the shotgun in an 
effort to accomplish his robbery. Third, immediately after 
leaving the store he indicated that the money he had ob-
tained wasn't much to "shoot an old man for." Further, in 
his statements to Johnnie Buck, he stated he just shot "the 
old son-of-a-bitch and I think I killed him" (R. 64). All of 
this evidence, coupled with the nature of the shooting, the 
fact that it was committed deliberately and intentionally in 
an effort to coerce the victim into relinquishing his prop-
erty, and that the appellant was of the opinion that he had 
killed his victim, is clearly sufficient evidence upon which 
the jury could infer that the appellant intended to murder 
Mr. Brady. 
The evidence before the jury raised a factual issue which 
they resolved adverse to the appellant. There is no basis to 
claim error on appeal. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RECEIVE EVIDENCE IM-
PEACHING THE CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED IN THE 
ABSENCE OF THE ACCUSED HAVING PLACED HIS CHAR-
ACTER IN ISSUE. 
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In his final point, the appellant piteously argues that the 
trial court committed error by allowing testimony adverse 
to the defendant's character to be received in evidence prior 
to the time the appellant had placed his character in issue. 
Once again the appellant bases his argument upon the ad-
mission of the testimony of Johnnie Buck and, consequently, 
the point, as can be seen from what has been said before, is 
without merit. 
As an aside to the issue, the appellant contends that the 
argument of the prosecutor to the effect that the appellant 
had shown no compassion or regret for his offense attacked 
his character. It should be noted that no objection was 
made to the argument, and that the argument was merely 
fair comment upon the evidence as it was placed before the 
jury. There is no merit to the position of the appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
In State v. Kazda, supra, this court reversed the convic-
tion of the appellant for an error not involved in the instant 
appeal. The issues raised in this appeal are in no way re-
lated to those which warranted reversal in the previous case. 
The evidence overwhelmingly and conclusively proved the 
appellant's guilt, and the record of proceedings discloses 
that there was no error of any kind committed. 
The appellant has been given more than his day in court, 
and has been justly convicted. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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